HOW AND WHERE THEY GET THEIR TOOLS

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Despite increasing concern about cyberterrorism, the tactics and goals of the world’s terrorist organizations remain low-tech. Although the terrorist’s toolbox has changed with the advent of the Information Age, the objectives of the world’s terrorist organizations have not.

A growing percentage of terrorist attacks are designed to kill as many people as possible. Guns and conventional explosives have so far remained the weapons of choice for most terrorists.

However, terrorists are adopting information technology as an indispensable command-and-control tool. Raids on terrorist hideouts, for example, are increasingly likely to result in the seizure of computers and other IT equipment. Instead of just finding a few handwritten notebooks and address books, counterterrorism authorities are faced with dozens of CD-ROMs and hard drives. Likewise, terrorists’ increasing use of advanced encryption tools often delays the process of finding key files and information.

Terrorists groups, such as the Osama bin Laden organization, have yet to demonstrate that they value the relatively bloodless outcome of a cyberattack on the nation’s critical infrastructure, but the threat remains real. There are warning signals out there. If the United States fails to recognize this, then the United States will pay another high price like they did on 9-11.

Information Weapons

There are several weapons or tools currently available that can negate, destroy, or incapacitate information systems, with many more being rapidly developed. Within this part of the chapter, these are broadly grouped into three main types: High Energy Radio Frequency (HERF) guns, Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP), and other information weapons.

HERF Guns

A HERF gun (as discussed briefly in Chapter 12) is a device that directs high-power radio energy at an electronic target. Electronic circuits are vulnerable to overload; a HERF gun simply overloads particular circuits to disable specific pieces of equipment that are dependent on that circuit. A HERF gun can be designed to cause varying degrees of damage from simply shutting a system down to physically destroying equipment. Pointed at a computer, a HERF gun may either permanently or temporarily terminate its operations. A HERF gun pointed at a “fly-by-wire” aircraft may trigger a catastrophic failure.

Although currently limited in range and destructive capacity, in the near future, HERF guns are likely to be substantially more capable and freely available and, therefore, must be taken seriously. HERF guns represent an excellent addition to the offensive military inventory of a nation, and also a significant threat if possessed by an enemy. The defensive measures that can be employed to reduce the risks of HERF attacks are not well developed at this stage, but include using Gaussian shielding, gaseous discharge devices, and the maintenance of physical separation.

Electro-Magnetic Pulse

Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) has been described as “the next great weapon to evolve in modern warfare.” Initially discovered as a side effect of nuclear tests, the phenomenon has now been extended to non-nuclear generators. Such generators can create an EMP that will disable unshielded electronic systems. A development beam generator with a one gigawatt capacity could be used to develop a line of sight EMP that would knock-out most unshielded electronic devices within a radius measurable in tens to hundreds of meters, depending on the employment method. High power microwaves, communications, computers, navigation, and data processing systems would be most affected by such weapons. The current limitations of these weapons are power generation and capacitor storage capability, but these can be expected to be overcome in the future.

Research is well advanced with EMP warheads recently being fitted on USAF air-launched cruise missiles. EMP weapons are less discriminatory than HERF guns and could be used to shut down a general area rather than a specific system. Again, with the exception of screening techniques such as Gaussian shielding, defensive measures are not common.

Other Information Weapons

There are several weapons that are currently being developed that do not fit in the HERF or EMP categories. Some already are in service with various military forces, others remain on the drawing board. The following weapons are described in a variety of freely available publications and give an indication of the technologies being developed and the possible capabilities that may result.

Low-Energy Lasers

These lasers can be used to damage the optical systems of sensors (including data collection devices), thus attacking the information systems at the data collection level. Low-energy lasers have already been fitted on rifles and armored vehicles and were deployed during the Gulf War. A number of systems are reported to be under further development in the United States and United Kingdom.

Electrical Power Disruption Technologies

An electric power disruption munition was first used during the Gulf War in 1991. The technology originated after an accident on the U.S. West Coast when chaff cut power supplies to the city of San Diego in 1985. The weapon uses light conductive carbon fibers that wrap around transmission lines and distribution points to cause a massive short circuit. Even when power is restored, the fibers must be removed because any breeze can result in another short circuit. This weapon can be delivered by cruise missiles, as was the case in the Gulf War, or from manned aircraft.

Individually, each of the military information operations (MIO) tools (previously discussed in Chapter 12) and techniques just described, will present a military commander, whether operating in the conventional or IW environment, with a substantial force multiplier. Collectively, they offer a decisive addition to military power. As more MIO capabilities are developed, the effectiveness of the MIO strategy will increase exponentially, reflecting the synergistic relationship that exists between individual elements of the MIO environment. Accordingly, nations developing information strategies should consider investment, both intellectually and financially, across the gamut of information operations.

New Arsenals, Old Rivalries

Could a small country develop the capability to hit the United States with a long-range unconventional weapon? Most certainly one could. But whether such a state would be inclined to try is an entirely different matter.

The risk is real. Congress learned in 1998, according to The Report of The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, that the United States has entered “a new nonproliferation environment” in which there is a far greater availability of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. As previously mentioned, the report was the work of a private commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld, secretary of defense under President Reagan and now Bush.

To begin with, the report refers to a club of renegade nations that appear to work with one another to DoDge the strictures of nonproliferation agreements. The states trade with one another, and build on the progress of other members of the club to advance their own systems. Indeed, it is arguable that the recent North Korean firing of a Taepo Dong missile was meant to further its own missile development and to serve, in effect, as a marketing demonstration to attract buyers from other countries outside the international nonproliferation framework.

Another factor, the report points out, is that access to information on a global scale keeps growing exponentially, as the bounds of the Internet in particular remain uncharted. What’s more, there has been an easing of access to what the Rumsfeld Commission terms the rudimentary technologies that were employed in early generations of U.S. and Soviet missile systems.

There is yet a fourth factor: the flexibility with which technical personnel from the West, and especially from the former Soviet Union, can move to a potential proliferator. Because so many third-world countries now have ballistic missiles of their own and, therefore, are interested in upgrades, whether of guidance or range, they are less pressed to acquire whole systems.

They are also well aware that it is the acquisition of such whole systems that garners the most international attention and is most easily policed by the Web of agreements, such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, that the United States and its allies have spun to guard against proliferation.

Instead, what many nations are focusing on is brainpower, people who are intimately familiar with technical data packages, who can advise on both long-term improvements and quick fixes, and who can offer recommendations on everything from guidance systems to materials technology to quality control to integration.

Many such scientists and technicians, particularly in the former Soviet states, are willing and eager to improve their material lot by helping renegade nations enhance systems that were often acquired from the Soviet Union or that are derivatives of such systems.

Although Western nations recognize the destabilizing impact of peripatetic unemployed scientists working in countries that “show them the money,” they can produce few options. Other than propose alternative employment, the United States and its allies have little to offer, particularly to those motivated by ideological or religious ideals. A significant number of missile owners are potential adversaries of the United State. And, many of the third-world powers have mutual supranational interests. Should a Muslim nation, for example, be taken over by extremists, it could seek support in other Muslim nations from like-minded elements that might not necessarily have seized power, but would be in a position to offer the new regime intellectual assistance and perhaps financial aid.

Certainly, even the availability of resources, and of willing foreign technologists, combined with nefarious intentions, does not in itself suffice for the successful pursuit of a program for intercontinental ballistic missiles. Otherwise, Libya would long ago have been in a position to threaten the United States. Nevertheless, the ability of lesser powers to mount such a threat over the next two decades cannot be ruled out.

Furthermore, as the recent North Korean and Iranian missile tests demonstrated yet again, a third-world country whose leadership is determined to advance its capabilities will not be deterred by nonproliferation regimes. It will find ways to draw upon outside resources in support of its program; and, no less important, it will do so well in advance of the timetables set forth by Western intelligence.

Stolen Thunder Tools

Like a neutron bomb (whose design Chinese agents allegedly stole), the Cox report demolished any doubt that China engages in espionage against the United States (see sidebar, “China Grabs U.S. Technology to Modernize Its Military”). But it left standing a whole array of big questions and small mysteries.

China Grabs U.S. Technology To Modernize Its Military

The request, to a Massachusetts defense contractor, seemed innocent enough: China needed fiber-optic gyroscopes, the latest in navigation equipment, for a new high-speed rail system, the buyers allegedly said. The deal might have gone through if not for a small hitch: The manufacturer recalled that the men, using a different company name, had tried earlier to get a U.S. license to export the gyroscopes to China—and had been turned down.

In 1999, U.S. Customs agents in San Diego arrested a Chinese national named Yao Yi for criminal export violations. Yi has pleaded not guilty; as well as his co-conspirator, Collin Shu, a Canadian, who was also arrested and pleaded not guilty. The two are accused of conspiracy to illegally export items designed for military purposes. The gyroscopes are generally used for guiding missiles or maneuvering fighter jets. To put these in a train, is like putting an F-14 engine in a Cessna.

Intense Debate

The gyroscope case is one of the latest incidents illuminating Beijing’s voracious appetite for high-end U.S. technology that has military capabilities. Also in 1999, a man was arrested in Detroit for allegedly trying to illegally ship to China a riot-control vehicle. A report by a panel chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-Calif.), in 1999, suggested that China may have married U.S. computer technology with nuclear weapons designs it stole in the 1980s from U.S. labs. The report presented no hard evidence of this. But it will almost certainly add fuel to an already intense debate over exports of high-speed computers to Beijing.

Proponents of the sale of high-tech goods to China say they help open the country to influences like American television shows beamed off U.S.-manufactured satellites. And, they add, U.S. electronics firms need foreign markets like China if they are to stay healthy in the face of stiff foreign competition.

The present and past administrations have generally supported this view. But in 1999, in a surprising turnaround, past Clinton advisers blocked California satellite maker Hughes Electronics Corp. from sending two $670 million satellites to be launched in China. Various officials offered different explanations for the decision, but the government told Hughes the launches could transfer too much militarily significant know-how.

Critics of high-tech exports to China say they have other concerns as well: The same technology that is already turning China into a land of ATM machines and cell phones could help the People’s Liberation Army begin to master information warfare. Pentagon officials counter that nobody is assessing the impact of the fiber-optic lines, electronic-switching gear, computers, and satellites pouring into China. Some examples:

In March 1996, as Beijing was threatening Taiwan with missiles, the State and Defense departments approved the export of two satellite receiving stations worth $7.3 million. The recipient, documents show, was China Electronic Systems Engineering Company, part of China’s military. The stations came equipped with ports to plug in Chinese-made encryption devices. The National Security Agency signed off on the deal, but congressional critics say the sale deserves a second look.

China buys nearly half of the supercomputers exported to high-risk countries. Experts point out that the Chinese can evade U.S. export controls by harnessing together less powerful machines—or buying high-capacity machines on a Russian Internet site. Industry groups plan to lobby Congress to allow more powerful machines to be exported, arguing that 1995 limits are already outdated. The Cox report calls for greater scrutiny, including spot checks in China to ensure the best machines are used only for civilian purposes. There are two trains rushing down the track directly at each other on this.

Experts say China’s rapidly modernizing military is still years from catching up with the United States, at best. But some worry that China will put high-tech imports to their best military uses and turn into a surprising adversary.

The most sensational charge in the 872-page report—that China has obtained secret data on every warhead in the U.S. nuclear arsenal—is based on a single document that a Chinese agent deliberately fed the CIA in 1995. Why would China’s spy masters tip their hand? Maybe they bungled, giving away too much in an effort to plant a double agent. Maybe they were warning Washington to butt out of China’s touchy relationship with Taiwan. Or, maybe, they were just following the 1,500-year-old advice of the military philosopher Sun Tzu to “sow confusion in the enemy’s camp.”

The release of the bipartisan Cox report in 1999 certainly did that. Its overall conclusions are chilling. For two decades, it says, China has used spies, front companies, and scientific exchanges to filch some of America’s most precious secrets. But on closer reading, it is still unclear how much damage has been done to U.S. national security. In most cases, it seems, Beijing got helpful hints, not blueprints.

Democrats on the congressional panel, which was led by Republican Rep. Christopher Cox of California, unanimously approved the report. But they also questioned its alarmist tone. There are, unfortunately, a number of places where the report reaches to make a point and, frankly, exaggerates.

On the other hand, concrete advances from spying sometimes don’t show up in weapon systems until years later. It’s possible, as Cox and some Pentagon officials argue, that the sum of China’s technological thievery is even larger than its parts. So how worried should Americans be? Here’s what the report does and does not say:

Nuclear Warheads

China stole classified design data on the W-88, a miniaturized nuclear warhead that is the most advanced in the U.S. arsenal. The CIA discovered this in 1995 when a Chinese “walk-in” (an agent who came forward voluntarily) handed over a Chinese document stamped “secret.” The unclassified version of the report does not reveal the contents of the document, but an administration official at the time said it contained two “quite specific and detailed” bits of data on the W-88. One was the size of the “package” containing the nuclear device, whose yield (explosive power) was already available from open sources. Although useful, that knowledge is a far cry from a detailed plan for a nuclear weapon. It’s more like looking at a car’s engine compartment and knowing how much horsepower the block can produce.

Because the CIA later determined that the “walk-in” was a double agent acting on the orders of China’s intelligence service, it is unclear whether the Chinese had already milked the information or never considered it all that important. The Chinese document, dated 1988, also described the size and yield of four other U.S. warheads. But that may have come from publicly available sources.

Why does China covet America’s nuclear secrets? The Cox committee concluded that U.S. technology would help China build smaller warheads to sit atop a new generation of lighter, mobile missiles. But the upgrade has been in the works for 23 years. And most experts think that its goal is to ensure China’s “second-strike capability”–the ability to retaliate for a nuclear attack, not to launch a first strike. Beijing’s leaders have good reason to worry about the reliability of their current strategic-missile force: fewer than 20 aging, 1950s-era rockets.

The first of the new missiles, the DF-31, won’t be able to reach most of the territory of the United States. But could it intimidate China’s neighbors or make the United States hesitate to defend Taiwan in a crisis? Definitely!

Rocket Technology

The Cox panel was established partly to look into allegations that two U.S. aerospace firms, Hughes and Loral, helped China to improve the reliability of its Long March booster rockets. The report says that the two companies ignored restrictions on technology transfers and gave away sensitive information while helping China investigate a series of failed attempts to launch the firms’ satellites into space.

What, exactly, did Chinese scientists learn? How to build better “fairings,” the nose cone that protects the satellite during launch. How to compensate for the violent winds that buffet rockets in flight. How to fix the Long March 3B’s guidance system. How to better investigate failed launches. This information has improved the reliability of Chinese rockets useful for civilian and military purposes.

Still, it is unclear how quickly China will be able to make those improvements. In the past, China has sometimes had difficulty absorbing Western technology. The spying and technology transfer is of enormous concern. But, having it in your hand doesn’t mean you know how to use it or effectively deploy it.

Computers

There is no mystery about how China got advanced computers. The question is what it does with them. Under relaxed export rules, China has legally bought 903 high-speed, American-made computers since 1996. The Cox report says that they have been used in nuclear weapons applications, such as modeling hypothetical explosions rather than conducting real ones after Beijing signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. But the congressional panel recommended spot checks to monitor the use of U.S. computers in the future, rather than cutting off sales.

Radar

The Cox report also asserts that classified U.S. radar research stolen by the People’s Republic of China could be used to threaten U.S. submarines. But the White House produced a letter from the Navy to the Justice Department stating, “It is difficult to make a case that significant damage has occurred” from the alleged disclosure.

China has never aspired to a large nuclear arsenal. One possible explanation for Beijing’s disclosure of its own espionage is that Chinese leaders wanted the world to know they could build a large, modern arsenal—if they wanted to. It’s deterrence on the cheap. If that was the plan, it just might have worked.

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